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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As globalization spurs increased competition in the international 
marketplace, countries around the world have hurried to implement 
competition policies to spur economic growth.1  Two of the world’s largest 
economies, India and China have recently developed and enacted new 
competition laws to encourage economic development, stimulate healthy 
market competition, and promote consumer welfare.2  How the law continues 
to develop in those countries has a great deal to do with their respective 
historical circumstances and present economic goals.3  For instance, China’s 
ultimate goal is to maintain political stability.  The country “relies on 
economic growth to maintain its holy grail of political stability and sees 
antitrust law as a driver of economic growth.”4  India’s competition act “lists 
the economic development of the country as a goal of the law, which may 
result in permitting anticompetitive activities that ostensibly contribute to 
development goals.”5  These potentially divergent economic development 
goals could have enormous implications on international business.6  
This Note examines and compares the developing antitrust laws in China 
and India.  Both nations are still developing into true market economies, and 
both see their respective competition laws as necessary parts of this 
evolution.  Through comparative assessment, this Note aims to identify areas 
in these new antitrust laws that cause apprehension among the international 
community and to make specific suggestions as to what each country can 
take from the other to assuage that international concern.  
The first section focuses on China’s legislative history regarding antitrust, 
and details some of the economic concerns driving the country’s adoption of 
new antitrust law.  The second section does the same for India.  The third 
provides a comparative overview of the two current legal regimes, including 
their relative standards and enforcement mechanisms.  This Note concludes 
by elaborating on both what suggestions from the international community 
might be most helpful to both countries in furthering the domestic goals of 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Christopher Hamp-Lyons, The Dragon in the Room: China’s Anti–Monopoly Law and 
International Merger Review, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1577, 1582 (2009). 
 2 Atleen Kaur, Competition Laws in the Lands of Tigers and Dragons: A Brief Update on 
India and China, 87 MICH. B.J. 34, 35 (2008). 
 3 Daniel A. Crane, Substance, Procedure, and Institutions in the International 
Harmonization of Competition Policy, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 143, 151–55 (2009) (noting that 
many emerging antitrust jurisdictions have their own historical circumstances that influence 
their current competition policy goals). 
 4 Id. at 153. 
 5 Id. at 153–54 (internal quotations omitted). 
 6 Id. at 146–51. 
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their respective competition laws, and China and India’s potential to assume 
leadership roles in the movement towards global antitrust harmonization. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Antitrust, also known as “competition,” law has grown phenomenally in 
recent years.7  As of 2010, over 120 countries had enacted a competition law 
to regulate their domestic economy’s place in the melting pot that is the 
international corporate market.8  Antitrust law can be succinctly defined as 
“[t]he body of law designed to protect trade and commerce from restraints, 
monopolies, price-fixing, and price discrimination.”9  Recently, China and 
India have made their presence felt in international antitrust circles through 
their drafting and enactment of new competition laws.10  In China’s case, the 
2008 adoption of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(AML) marks the emerging economic power’s first implementation of a 
comprehensive antitrust law.11  India, on the other hand, first implemented a 
competition law in 1969.12  This law, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act 1969 (MRTP), was adopted to deal with monopolistic practices 
under a “command and control” economy.13  Since 1991, India has shifted its 
economic gears to fall more in line with free market economic principles.14   
Accompanying this change was the recognition that the MRTP was an 
ineffective means to regulate the Indian economy in a free market context.15  
                                                                                                                   
 7 MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 2–3 (2010). 
 8 Id. at 3. 
 9 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (9th ed. 2009). 
 10 See generally Kaur, supra note 2, at 35 (“With many multinational companies either 
conducting or seeking to conduct business in the two countries, and their domestic industries 
experiencing unprecedented growth, it is paramount that the governments of India and China 
work to ensure healthy and competitive markets to allow consumers to reap the benefits of 
economic development.  The Indian and Chinese governments are responding by developing 
competition laws that will encourage market competition and consumer welfare.”).   
 11 Id. at 36; Martin Dajani, The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China: A 
Business Guide 3 (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.dlapiper.com/the-anti-monopoly-law-of-the- 
peoples-republic-of-china-02-08-2011/. 
 12 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, at 
India 5, 5–6 (H. Stephen Harris ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
 13 M.M. Sharma, India: Competition Law Enforcement Starts in India, MONDAQ (Sept. 29, 
2010), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=111152.  A “command and control” 
economy is one “in which the means of production are publicly owned and economic activity is 
controlled by a central authority that assigns quantitative production goals and allots raw 
materials to productive enterprises.”  Command Economy Definition, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/127708/command–economy 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
 14 Sharma, supra note 13.   
 15 See Kaur, supra note 2, at 35. 
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This realization in turn led to the 2003 adoption of a new competition law, 
the Competition Act of India (Competition Act) that replaces the MRTP.16  
This section provides context as to the different obstacles and concerns faced 
by China and India in the implementation of their new competition laws. 
A.  China’s Legislative History Regarding Antitrust Law 
The Chinese implementation of competition law has known three distinct 
eras.17  Initially, there was a complete absence of competition law.18  Before 
1978, China maintained a planned economy, a system that did not allow for 
unauthorized competition.19  Between 1978 and 1992, China adopted a 
“planned commodity” economy; this provided for limited competition.20  In 
1992 the People’s Republic of China adopted as its goal the creation of a 
“socialist market economy.”21  Since the 1990s, China has become more 
open to foreign investment, but such investment has been regulated to a point 
far beyond that allowed by international trade organizations such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).22  State regulation of foreign investment 
began to relax in 2001 to comply with China’s accession to the WTO.23 
The AML was adopted by the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Standing 
Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress.24  It went into effect on 
August 1, 2008 and reflects over thirteen years of drafting and consultation 
with international experts.25  A number of laws were adopted prior to the 
drafting of the AML, most notably the 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law 
(AUCL) and the 1997 Price Law (Price Law), both of which govern some 
antitrust issues.26  It is anticipated that the AML will supersede these other 
                                                                                                                   
 16 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at India 5–6. 
 17 Zhenguo Wu, Perspectives on the Chinese Anti–Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 
73–74 (2008).  
 18 Id. at 73. 
 19 Id. at 73–74. 
 20 Id. at 74. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Kaur, supra note 2, at 36. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Wu, supra note 17, at 73.  
 25 Id. at 73, 76–78.  
 26 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 17–19 (explaining that the 
AUCL was the first Chinese law to address unfair and anticompetitive practices).  Similar to 
the AML, the AUCL is concerned with “unfair competition,” a loosely defined term that 
refers to some antitrust issues also covered by the AML, such as predatory pricing.  Whether 
the AUCL continues as a law relevant to antitrust policy remains to be seen, as the AUCL 
provisions that overlap with those of the AML are still effective.  See id. at 19–21 (noting a 
similar overlap between the Price Law and the AML concerning predatory pricing issues, but 
noting that the Price Law has been invoked simultaneously with the AML, and that the Price 
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laws over time.  However, these laws still remain in effect despite the AML’s 
position as “China’s only comprehensive competition statute.”27  As the 
AML is meant to supplant the AUCL, the Price Law, and a host of other 
semi-related antitrust provisions, the AML is the focus of this Note.28 
As the brief history above highlights, China has expended a huge number 
of resources in drafting what it hopes will be a comprehensive competition 
law that will transition smoothly into the existing international antitrust 
framework while forwarding China’s commitment to the growth of its 
“socialist market economy.”  
B.  India’s Legislative History Regarding Antitrust Law   
India attained independence in 1947.29  Shortly thereafter, India adopted 
“command and control laws, rules, regulations, and executive orders.”30  
India’s first competition law was the MRTP, enacted in 1969, which drew its 
authority from Articles 38 and 39 of the Indian Constitution.31  The relevant 
Article states: “The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by 
securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which 
justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the 
national life.”32  The Indian command economy lasted until 1991, when the 
Indian government began a program of economic liberalization.33  This shift 
towards a market economy led to increased competition in the marketplace 
and the decision by the Indian government to replace the MRTP Act with the 
Competition Act, a decision summed up as follows:  
In the pursuit of globalization, India has responded by opening 
up its economy, removing controls, and resorting to 
liberalization.  The natural corollary to this is that the Indian 
market should be geared to face competition from within the 
country and outside.  The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act, 1969, has become obsolete in certain respects in 
                                                                                                                   
Law’s efficacy seems to stem from its ability to reap more specific local results with regards 
to price fixing). 
 27 Id. at China 13. 
 28 Id.  
 29 Id. at India 5. 
 30 Id.; see also S. Chakravarthy, Economic Nationalism and Competition Policy: The 
Metamorphoses in Indian Competition Regime (2009), http://www.manupatra.in/etc/e-book/J 
ournals2010/CompLRB252FF45F3C67D4980CC1953DAF7BF84/text.html. 
 31 INDIA CONST. art. 38, cl. 1. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Chakravarthy, supra note 30.  
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the light of international economic developments, relating more 
particularly to competition laws, and there is a need to shift our 
focus from curbing monopolies to promoting competition.34 
As such, the Indian government passed the Competition Act on January 13, 
2003 and began to enact several provisions with the full force of law on 
March 31, 2003.35  These provisions are to be enforced using the 
adjudicatory powers of the aptly named Competition Commission of India 
(CCI), an entity created by the government on October 14, 2003.36  By the 
end of 2003, the provisions in force dealt mostly with the procedural 
establishment of the CCI; “provisions related to anticompetitive agreements 
and abuse of dominance” were not given legal effect until May 20, 2009.37  
Even more recently, the Competition Act’s merger control regulations 
(“combination regulations” in the terms of the Competition Act) were 
enacted on June 1, 2011.38 
The large temporal gap between the initial adoption of the Competition 
Act’s procedural and substantive provisions was caused by a lawsuit alleging 
that the CCI’s adjudicatory powers constituted a violation of India’s 
separation of powers doctrine.39  The CCI as a functioning body was placed 
in limbo from 2003 until 2007, when the Competition (Amendment) Act was 
passed by Parliament.40  The Amendment Act created the Competition 
Appellate Tribunal, and requires the Tribunal to be chaired by either a retired 
Supreme Court Justice or a High Court Chief Justice.41  This Tribunal will 
serve as an adjudicatory oversight body for the CCI.42 
While India’s competition law has been slower to get off the ground than 
China’s AML, the fact that most of the Competition Act’s substantive 
provisions are now fully implemented and helmed by one adjudicative body 
                                                                                                                   
 34 VINOD DHALL, COMPETITION LAW TODAY: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND THE LAW IN PRACTICE 
499, 499–500 (2007). 
 35 See Anurag K. Agarwal, Competition Law in India: Need to Go Slow and Steady 3 
(Indian Inst. on Mgmt. Ahmedabad, Working Paper No. 2005–10–05, 2005), available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/iim/iimawp/wp01912.html (noting the ratification and implementation 
dates of the Competition Act). 
 36 Sharma, supra note 13. 
 37 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at India 6–7. 
 38 Yash A. Rana, India: India’s New Competition Guidelines Present a Minefield for M&A 
and Private Equity Globally, MONDAQ (July 6, 2011), http://mondaq.com/x/137862/Trade+Re 
gulation+Practices/Indias+New+Competition+Guidelines+Present+a+Minefield+for+MA+an 
d+Private+Equity+Globally. 
 39 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at India 7. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
2013]       CAN THE TIGER SIT DOWN WITH THE DRAGON?  837 
 
 
promotes faith that the Competition Act will prove to be a more effective 
mechanism to govern competition law than the MRTP.  
C.  Economic Goals of Antitrust Law Generally  
Each country that has adopted a competition law (over 120 and counting) 
has done so to regulate a market economy and to prevent private industry 
from wielding its power in a manner that would undermine national 
economic growth.43  This type of regulation is generally held to foster the 
growth of healthy competition thereby creating markets responsive to 
consumer needs, which should in turn result in heightened consumer welfare 
and economic efficiency.44  While these tenets are generally held to be true, 
each country that adopts a competition law does so for more specific, 
secondary policy reasons as well, and it is these secondary reasons that are 
the focus of this section.45 
D.  China’s Economic Goals Regarding Antitrust Law   
The main impetus behind China’s drafting and subsequent adoption of the 
AML was the country’s accession to the WTO.46  Since the economic 
opening-up of 1979, China’s economy has been in a boom period, and 
maintaining this growth is the government’s main economic concern.47  
China’s economic growth during this boom came at the expense of many of 
its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a sector viewed as “key engines of 
economic development.”48  China’s concern that increased domestic 
                                                                                                                   
 43 See DHALL, supra note 34, at 3 (explaining the general economic goals of competition law). 
 44 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2004, Competition, 
Competitiveness and Development: Lessons From Developing Countries, 3, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2004/1 (2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/ditcclp200 
41_en.pdf [hereinafter United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] (explaining the 
broad economic policy for implementation of competition laws). 
 45 The proposition that China and India fall in line with the majority of other countries’ 
reasons for adopting new competition law is supported by the texts of their respective laws.  
Fan long duan fa [Anti–Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. 
Gaz. 517–23 (P.R.C.), art. 2 [hereinafter AML]; The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003, 
INDIA CODE (2003), pmbl. [hereinafter the Competition Act].   
 46 See H. Stephen Harris, Jr., The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti–Monopoly 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 176–77 (2006) (explaining that 
China’s accession to the WTO and the ensuing international concerns about transparency 
prompted the drafting of the AML). 
 47 See id. at 173 (noting that reforms and legislative enactments led to China’s economic 
growth over the last several decades). 
 48 Id. at 174, 176. 
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competition from foreign firms would result in Chinese job loss due to the 
“inevitable demise of unproductive state-owned industries” highlights 
China’s main interest other than general economic growth—maintaining 
domestic tranquility.49  This interest, dubbed “Harmonious Society,” is 
especially salient under a monist political regime, as any marked decrease in 
the overall quality of life could result in political instability, something China 
is anxious to avoid.50  The AML’s drafting process shows the Chinese 
commitment to maintaining the “Harmonious Society” in the midst of its 
transition to a more open, global economy.51 
The overarching goal of the AML’s drafters was to write the law in a 
manner that would allow China’s “socialist market economy” to develop in 
compliance with international practices and to promote an economic system 
with self-regulating “natural selection” wherein the strongest firms survive 
and thrive.52  The drafters were guided by four principles.  First, that the 
AML reflect China’s adoption of a new, market economy system.53  Second, 
that the AML should mirror the development of the Chinese economy and 
incrementally impose its anti-monopoly framework.54  Third, the AML 
should borrow liberally from more established foreign legislation and fit 
them onto the Chinese antitrust frame.55  Fourth, the drafters were to ensure 
that the AML complied with the reality and requirements of a global 
economy in order to aid in China’s integration into the global framework.56 
These guiding principles bode well for the flexibility of the AML, which 
is necessary for the law to adapt to the disparate demands that will be placed 
on its use by the international community.  China’s vested interest in 
maintaining control over the development of the economy, in an area like 
antitrust where success depends on foreign investment, requires laudable 
juggling skills on the part of China’s government, especially because many 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Id. at 176.  
 50 Maureen Fan, China’s Party Leadership Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society’ 
Doctrine Proposed By President Hu Formally Endorsed, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at A18. 
 51 See Harris, supra note 46, at 177–83 (noting that internal support for liberalization and 
legal reform has been tempered by the prospect of consequential bankruptcies, job losses, and 
social unrest and providing an outline of the drafting process).  
 52 Wu, supra note 17, at 77–78; see also AML, supra note 45, art. 1 (“This Law is 
formulated with the goal of preventing and curtailing monopolistic practices, protecting fair 
market competition, increasing economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers 
as well as society as a whole, and promoting the healthy development of the socialist market 
economy.”). 
 53 Wu, supra note 17, at 78–79.  
 54 Id. at 79.  
 55 Id.  
 56 Id. 
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Western experts lack any real idea as to how the AML should react to 
China’s unique situation.57 
E.  India’s Economic Goals Regarding Antitrust Law 
All countries, especially developing ones, face unique challenges in 
implementing a competition law and have specific reasons for doing so.  As 
noted above, a widely accepted objective for any competition law is to 
enhance economic efficiency as a means to spur economic development.58  It 
is commonly held that such development will lower prices and enrich the 
overall welfare of the consumer, who will then be in a better position to 
inject capital back into the economic artery.59  This injection rewards 
innovation, thus encouraging further economic development.60  In India, 
these goals were to be carried out by the MRTP, and a brief synopsis of that 
law’s failings is necessary to understand India’s reasons for implementing 
the Competition Act.61 
Like China, India opened its economy in the early 1990s.62  This opening 
led to trade liberalization and a commensurate increase in foreign 
corporations establishing a presence in India.63  This foreign business 
presence, in addition to India’s obligations to the WTO, led the Indian 
government to the realization that the MRTP as it stood in the 1990s needed 
to change if it were to adequately protect Indian industry.64  The Indian 
government appointed a committee to formulate a competition policy that 
would allow for legislation appropriate for India’s new place in the global 
economy.65  As noted previously, the committee decided that India required a 
new competition law.66  The MRTP lacked a provision allowing for the 
creation of a “watchdog for the introduction and maintenance of competition 
policy.”67  The Committee also found that “[c]ompetition law should deal 
with anti-competitive practices, particularly cartelization, price-fixing and 
other abuses of market power and should regulate mergers,” something the 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Hamp–Lyons, supra note 1, at 1597–98. 
 58 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 44, at 3. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Aditya Bhattacharjea, India’s New Competition Law: A Comparative Assessment, 4 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 609, 610 (2008).  
 62 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at India 6. 
 63 T. RAMAPPA, COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA: POLICY, ISSUES, AND DEVELOPMENTS 6 (2006). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Id. at 8.  
 67 Id. at 7.  
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MRTP did not do.68  As such, the MRTP was perceived as an impotent 
measure to combat unfair competition.69    
Taking these findings into account, the Indian government unveiled the 
Competition Act in 2003.70  The principle objectives as stated in the 
Competition Act are to:  
[P]rovide, . . . keeping in view of the economic 
development . . . of the Indian economy, . . . for the 
establishment of a Competition Commission to prevent 
practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and 
sustain competition [in Indian markets], to protect the interests 
of consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by 
other participants in markets in India, and for matters therewith 
or incidental thereto.71 
Typically, developing countries enact competition laws with dual sets of 
objectives.72  The primary objectives of the Competition Act are of a macro-
economic nature and deal with broad ideas like consumer welfare and 
economic development.73  “[T]he ultimate objective of the competition 
law . . . is the protection of the interest of the consumer,” a primary objective 
more fully defined in the Competition Act.74  The secondary objectives 
typically included in competition laws describe the country’s more local, 
specialized needs.75  Unlike the AML, no secondary reasons for 
promulgating the Competition Act have been given.76 
Whether these primary objectives will be met through Indian antitrust 
regulation remains to be seen.  India faces challenges unique from those 
being confronted in China, beginning with how India’s competition law will 
coexist with India’s democratic government.  The Indian government does 
not have the power to enforce a state resolution like China’s “Harmonious 
Society,” and its democracy prevents it from making swift changes to react 
                                                                                                                   
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 17. 
 70 Id. at 1.  
 71 The Competition Act, supra note 45, Statement of Objects and Reasons, ¶ 1. 
 72 Shiju Varghese Mazhuvanchery, The Indian Competition Act: A Historical and 
Developmental Perspective, 3 L. & DEV. REV., no. 2, at 241, 254 (2010). 
 73 Id. at 255.  
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. at 254.  
 76 Id. at 254–55.  
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and deal with unforeseen antitrust issues.77  This problem was one of the 
reasons behind the failure of the MRTP, but it has been addressed in the new 
competition law.78  All in all, it is apparent that the economic goal of the 
Competition Act is in its name: it strives to promote the national desire for 
Indian corporations to “level the playing field” with incoming international 
firms.79 
III.  MERGER REVIEW IN CHINA AND INDIA  
Mergers “are the combination of previously independent firms into one 
firm.”80  This type of corporate interbreeding can effectively occur in two 
ways: through a formal merger combining two separate corporations into a 
single entity, or by one corporation absorbing another corporation’s assets.81  
This distinction is unimportant in the context of antitrust law and 
governance; the salient concern is that a merger changes what were once 
separate, competitive businesses into a common business entity with a single 
profit interest.82   
These types of business combinations are typically addressed, via merger 
laws, in three ways: notification procedures, merger thresholds, and public 
benefit assessments.83  This section explores merger review under the AML 
                                                                                                                   
 77 See India’s Surprising Economic Miracle: The Country’s State May Be Weak, But Its 
Private Companies Are Strong, ECONOMIST (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.economist.com/no 
de/17147648 (comparing how in China, when the government decides to dam a river, build a 
road, or move a village, the dam goes up, the road goes down and the village disappears 
without citizens standing in the way). 
 78 See RAMAPPA, supra note 63, at 45 (detailing how Section 49 of the Competition Act has 
allowed for the CCI to present its opinion to the Indian government prior to the adoption of 
any new competition policies).  Although the government is not bound by the opinion of the 
CCI, the review process does allow for the hope of consistency in future antitrust 
amendments. Id.  
 79 Id. at xiii–xiv.  Ramappa further suggests that the government should resist the initial 
urge to tamper too much with the goings–on in the marketplace but should instead halt at 
laying the groundwork for healthy competition to exist. 
 80 EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 871 
(2007). 
 81 Id.  
 82 Id. 
 83 MARTYN TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW: A NEW DIMENSION FOR THE 
WTO? 85 (2006).  Notification procedures “typically involve a procedure whereby firms 
notify a competition authority of mergers and acquisitions that may create excessive market 
concentration or otherwise adversely impact on competition.”  Id. at 85–86.  Merger 
thresholds define a certain measure that, if exceeded, requires a nation’s antitrust authority to 
investigate the effects of the proposed merger.  See id. at 87–88 (explaining the different types 
of merger thresholds and their use as tools by many competition law authorities).  A public 
benefit assessment requires the antitrust authority to weigh the anticipated societal benefits 
842   GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:831 
 
and the Competition Act, as well as the enforcement mechanisms present in 
each of the two laws. 
A.  Standards of Review and Extraterritorial Effects of Mergers  
As globalization increases, there is an increasingly high risk that proposed 
mergers be subjected to review in an ever-larger number of jurisdictions.84  
Where a merger requires international comity to ensure success, one nation’s 
objection can derail the entire process.85  If a nation’s dismissal of an 
attempted merger is viewed by the international community as lacking a 
legitimate antitrust basis and is perceived as solely a means to favor its own 
domestic goals, serious tensions can arise between the affected countries.86 
As the number of countries with full-fledged competition laws grows, so 
too does the number of competition laws that have extraterritorial effect.87  
The potential commercial dangers caused by this proliferation of 
extraterritorial regulation are evident in the proposed merger of General 
Electric (GE) and Honeywell International, two U.S. companies incorporated 
in and operated from the U.S.  The U.S. cleared the transaction, but the 
European Union blocked the merger due to its perceived potential for 
monopolistic practice.88  The result of the European Commission’s decision 
was that the merger was blocked in both the European Union (EU) and in the 
U.S., despite neither party to the proposed merger being European.89  This 
highlights the unfortunate reality that individual nations, in applying their 
respective competition laws, have no duty to show deference to other nations 
in their assessment of a merger’s validity, even where both corporations hail 
from a foreign nation.90   
                                                                                                                   
that could grow from a merger against the potential anti–competitive effects stemming from 
the merger.  See id. at 89 (explaining how public benefit can outweigh anti–competitive 
effects in certain situations).   
 84 Hamp–Lyons, supra note 1, at 1578–79. 
 85 Id. at 1579. 
 86 See id. at 1599–1602 (detailing international concerns over potentially protectionist 
application of the AML). 
 87 See Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of 
International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 207 (explaining how, despite 
antitrust laws being predominantly national laws, their extraterritorial application has been the 
traditional means by which nations deal with antitrust issues).  
 88 Eleanor M. Fox, The European Court’s Judgment in GE/Honeywell: Not a Poster Child 
For Comity or Convergence, 20 SPG ANTITRUST 77, 77–78 (2006). 
 89 Kyle Robertson, Note, One Law to Control Them All: International Merger Analysis in 
the Wake of GE/Honeywell, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 154. 
 90 Id. at 155. 
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The U.S. and EU antitrust laws are the two most developed bodies of 
antitrust law in the world91 and are generally held to be very similar in their 
treatment of antitrust issues.92  If these two long-developing bodies of law 
can reach such opposite views on a merger, it is no wonder that the global 
business community monitors the infancy of Chinese and Indian antitrust law 
with apprehension.  As two of the largest emerging markets on the planet, a 
great number of potential mergers will fall under the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of their respective competition laws.93  The way these two 
eastern giants review mergers and enforce their decisions will likely play a 
huge role on the international economic stage as competition laws develop.  
1.  Mergers/Combinations—Standards of Review Under the AML   
While the provisions of the AML as a whole are enforced by an 
administrative hydra comprised of the Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC), 
the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authorities (AMEA), and the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM), merger review is commenced solely under the 
auspices of MOFCOM.94  The standards of review for mergers under the 
AML are laid out in the fourth chapter of the AML, “Concentration of 
Business Operators.”95  “Concentration of Business Operators” for purposes 
of the AML is defined in Article 20, and refers to three types of 
concentrations: “mergers[,] acquisitions of control of another business 
operator through acquisition of equity or assets[,] and acquisitions of control 
of, or of the capacity to exercise decisive influence over, another business 
operator by contract or other means.”96  Operator concentration can either 
promote or hinder competition in a globalized economy.97   
                                                                                                                   
 91 See William Sugden, Note, Global Antitrust and the Evolution of an International 
Standard, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989, 1007 (2002) (calling the United States and the EU 
“the two superpowers of world antitrust regimes”).  
 92 Robertson, supra note 89, at 155–56. 
 93 See discussion supra Part II. 
 94 Janet L. McDavid & Jun Wei, Merger Control Under China’s Anti–Monopoly Law: 
High-Profile Cases and Key Developments, in 2 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, ANTITRUST 
INSTITUTE 2011: DEVELOPMENTS & HOT TOPICS 989, 991 (2011). 
 95 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 41. 
 96 See id. (explaining AML Article 20); see also AML, supra note 45, art. 20. 
 97 See Wu, supra note 17, at 87–88 (“[C]oncentration is an important means to increase 
scope, realize economies of scale . . . and, accordingly, lower market risk and increase 
competitiveness.  At the same time, operator concentrations can decrease or even eliminate 
competitors in the market . . . and, accordingly, threaten effective competition . . . .”). 
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Article 27 of the AML identifies several factors MOFCOM should 
consider when engaged in merger review.98  The required documents to file 
with MOFCOM are similar to those required by the European Union, but 
documents written in a language other than Chinese must be accompanied by 
a Chinese translation.99  Much of the specific guidance for merger review 
under the AML is still in draft form and, as such, is of only limited utility for 
foreign corporations seeking to expand into China.  This problem is 
compounded by the fact that little analysis of how MOFCOM applies these 
regulations currently exists, making it difficult to anticipate exactly how 
MOFCOM’s analysis of a proposed merger will come out.100  The most 
informative analysis currently available can be found in MOFCOM’s public 
merger decisions. However, MOFCOM’s explanations contain significant 
omissions and potential for errors in interpretation.101 
Despite the brevity of MOFCOM decisions, certain insights into the 
review process can be gleaned from the decisions issued thus far.102  For 
example, where the merger involves the “combination of well-known 
brands,” there is a heightened risk of scrutiny.103  Heightened care should 
also be taken where a company involved in a merger has a dominant or 
leading position in the market, especially where the proposed merger could 
threaten smaller domestic companies.104   
MOFCOM’s standard for review of proposed mergers, while murky, 
appears to offer an improvement over China’s law on the subject prior to the 
adoption of the AML.105  Previous to the adoption of the AML, China 
implemented a merger review process that applied only to “foreign 
                                                                                                                   
 98 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 50; see also AML, supra note 
45, art. 27 (“The following factors should be considered when investigating Operator 
consolidations: (1) The relevant market share of Operators party to the consolidation as well 
as their ability to control the market; (2) The degree of consolidation in relevant markets; (3) 
The effect of the consolidation on market entry and technological advance; (4) The effect of 
the consolidation on consumers and other Operators; (5) The effect of the consolidation on 
national economic development; and (6) Other factors that the State Council anti–monopoly 
law enforcement authorities regard as worth consideration.”). 
 99 McDavid & Wei, supra note 94, at 991–92. 
 100 Id. at 995. 
 101 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 50, 52.  An example of 
MOFCOM’s public statements regarding proposed mergers can be found at Andrew Batson, 
China’s Statement Blocking Coca–Cola Huiyuan Deal, CHINA REAL TIME REPORT (Mar. 18, 
2009, 6:58 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/03/18/china%E2%80%99s-statement-
blocking-coca-cola-huiyuan-deal/. 
 102 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 52. 
 103 Id.  
 104 Id. 
 105 Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market 
Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643, 708–09 (2010). 
2013]       CAN THE TIGER SIT DOWN WITH THE DRAGON?  845 
 
 
companies seeking to acquire domestic Chinese companies.”106  According 
to Article 2 of the AML, merger review now encompasses proposed 
domestic mergers, although in effect little has changed, as all published 
merger reviews have involved foreign companies.107  However, the fact that 
the law identifies domestic mergers as within MOFCOM’s power should 
encourage international investors, especially in light of MOFCOM’s track 
record of granting approval.  The agency has reviewed seven proposed 
mergers, and allowed six of them to move forward.108  As each of these 
mergers involved a foreign corporation, this approval rate should give 
investors a reason to feel cautiously optimistic about their chances for 
success with a merger proposal in China. 
2.  Mergers/Combinations—Standards of Review Under the Competition 
Act  
The Competition Act’s provisions regarding merger control came into 
effect on June 1, 2011.109  The Competition Act forbids any person or 
enterprise from entering into a merger that “causes or is likely to cause an 
appreciable adverse effect on competition within the relevant market in India 
and such a combination shall be void.”110  A “combination” for purposes of 
the Competition Act can mean any merger or acquisition that would result in 
“control, shares, voting rights or assets” whose value eclipses certain 
thresholds laid out in the Competition Act.111  “Combination” also refers to 
an acquisition “of control by a person over an enterprise when such person 
has already direct or indirect control over another enterprise engaged in 
production, distribution or trading of a similar or identical or substitutable 
goods or provision of a similar or identical or substitutable service, if” the 
newly acquired business has assets within or outside India worth over the 
                                                                                                                   
 106 Id. at 708. 
 107 Id. at 708–09. 
 108 Id.  
 109 Rana, supra note 38. 
 110 The Competition Act, supra note 45, § 6(1). 
 111 Id. § 5(a).  “Control,” for purposes of the Competition Act, is defined as “controlling the 
affairs or management by (i) one or more enterprises, either jointly or singly, over another 
enterprise or group [or] (ii) one or more groups, either jointly or singly, over another group or 
enterprise.” Id. § 5, explanation (a).  A “group” is found  
when two or more enterprises are, directly or indirectly, in a position to (i) 
exercise 26 percent or more of the voting rights in the other enterprise; or (ii) 
appoint more than 50 percent of the members of the board of directors of the 
other enterprise, or (iii) control the management or affairs of the other 
enterprise. 
Id. § 5, explanation (b). 
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amount set by the Act.112  Finally, “combination” can also, according to the 
Competition Act, refer to a merger or amalgamation between businesses 
where the combining parties cross the location and asset value thresholds laid 
out in the Act.113  The value of the threshold assets is measured according to 
the previous year’s audited totals, and takes into account such intangibles as 
goodwill, trademark, copyright and a host of other factors.114 
While the portions of the Competition Act dealing with combinations 
were implemented well after the Act’s other substantive provisions, the CCI 
spent that time accepting criticism of its Draft Combination Regulations 
from interested parties around the world.115  Many of these criticisms were 
taken to heart by the CCI and were addressed with the May 11, 2011 
publication of the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to 
the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011 
(Combination Regulations).116  While the CCI’s apparent willingness to 
accept criticism should be looked upon favorably by many in the 
international community, commentators have made clear that the changes 
have not answered all questions nor smoothed all perceived wrinkles from 
the combination regulations.117 
The Competition Act lays out a list of factors similar to those utilized in 
the AML that the CCI is required to consider in “determining whether a 
combination would have the effect of or is likely to have an appreciable 
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market . . . .”118  The CCI acted 
quickly in showing its willingness to exercise its powers of review, passing 
its first clearance of a proposed combination on July 26, 2011, just over one 
month after the Competition Act’s combination provisions were brought into 
force.119   
                                                                                                                   
 112 Id. § 5(b). 
 113 Id. § 5(c). 
 114 Id. § 5, explanation (c). 
 115 See David A. Carpenter et al., Competition M&A Rules in India Finalized, MAYER BROWN 
LEGAL UPDATE (May, 2011), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/Competitio 
n-MampA-rules-in-India-finalized-05-11-2011/ (detailing the adjustments made between the 
Draft Regulations and the Combination Regulations). 
 116 Rana, supra note 38; the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in Regard to the 
Transaction of Business Relating to Combinations) Regulations, No. 3 of 2011, INDIA CODE 
(2011), vol. 98.   
 117 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 118 See the Competition Act, supra note 45, § 20(4) (laying out the fourteen factors the CCI 
should consider in ruling on whether a proposed combination is or is not acceptable). 
 119 Kian Ganz, Breaking: AZB, TTA Get First Ever CCI Combination Clearance in 18 Days 
for Reliance–Bharti AXA Merger, LEGALLY INDIA (July 27, 2011, 7:58 PM), http://www.leg 
allyindia.com/201107272238/Competition-Law/breaking-azb-tta-get-first-ever-cci-combinat 
ion-clearance-in-18-days-for-reliance-bharti-axa-merger. 
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B.  Enforcement Under the AML  
MOFCOM is tasked with enforcement of the AML’s provisions 
concerning mergers and acquisitions.120  MOFCOM has the power to either 
clear a proposed combination or to further investigate its potential effects on 
competition.121  This initial decision must be made within thirty days of the 
agency receiving notice of the proposed transaction.122  MOFCOM can 
directly block a proposed merger where this initial inquiry convinces the 
agency that “[o]perator consolidation has the effect of restricting or 
eliminating competition . . . .”123  If a proposed merger or acquisition passes 
MOFCOM’s initial scrutiny, the transaction could still be subject to further 
restrictions per Article 29 of the AML, which allows MOFCOM “to place 
restrictive conditions on the consolidation which will diminish its negative 
effects on market competition.”124  MOFCOM is charged with making its 
reasoning public when it denies a proposed combination or when it forces 
restrictive conditions as a prerequisite for a combination to move forward.125  
However, MOFCOM’s explanations for its decisions relating to mergers thus 
far have been scant.126  
C.  Enforcement Under the Competition Act  
In India, the CCI enforces the Competition Act under Chapter IV of the 
Act.127  In rendering its judgment on whether a combination will have a 
deleterious effect on competition, the CCI follows “principles of natural 
justice,” and is not bound by India’s Code of Civil Procedure.128  This phrase 
“refers to allowing each person for whom there is an investigation to have an 
                                                                                                                   
 120 McDavid & Wei, supra note 94, at 991–92. 
 121 Id.  
 122 AML, supra note 45, art. 25. 
 123 Id. art. 28.  It is worthwhile to note that Article 28 allows the “Operator” to rebut such a 
finding through a showing that the transaction’s potential to foster competition or to promote 
the “public interest” clearly outweighs its potential negative effects on competition.  Id.  The 
AML does not elucidate exactly how such potential can be shown, nor does it define “public 
interest.”  Id. 
 124 Id. art. 29. 
 125 Id. art. 30. 
 126 See Batson, supra note 101 (demonstrating that while MOFCOM does make statements 
public, thus living up to its duties under AML Article 30, these statements do not provide 
insight into the agency’s decision making process beyond MOFCOM’s assessment that a 
transaction will have negative effects on competition).  
 127 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at India 28–29 (outlining the 
enforcement duties and obligations of the CCI). 
 128 Id. at India 30. 
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opportunity of being heard; this concept is presented in the legal maxim audi 
alteram partem, which means ‘no man shall be condemned unheard.’ ”129 
Once the relevant merger documentation has been submitted to the CCI, 
the Competition Act gives the CCI the power to allow the transaction to 
progress or to disallow the transaction.130   The CCI makes this inquiry based 
on its own knowledge and information, which explains why premerger 
notification is mandatory under the Competition Act.131  Section 20 of the 
Competition Act lays out the methodology for the CCI’s investigation of a 
supposed violation of the Act’s regulations on combinations.132  The CCI 
may also, if it believes that the proposed combination will have an adverse 
effect on competition, order appropriate modification of the agreement where 
it believes such modification will remedy the anti-competitive effects of the 
combination.133   
IV.  INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS 
There are a host of international concerns regarding China’s and India’s 
implementation of their merger laws.134  This section provides an overview 
of some of the more current concerns expressed by the international 
community beginning with the possible extraterritorial effects of the two 
laws.  This section then briefly highlights more specific concerns regarding 
each of the two countries. 
A.  Extraterritoriality  
Competition laws have proliferated throughout the developing world in 
recent years; China and India are two of the larger players on the world stage 
to have implemented them. Merger control regimes have grown 
exponentially, to the point where “[m]erger control is out of control.”135  The 
AML’s extraterritorial effects are laid out in Article 2, which states that 
                                                                                                                   
 129 Id.  
 130 The Competition Act, supra note 45, § 31(1)–(2). 
 131 RAMAPPA, supra note 63, at 258; see also The Competition Act, supra note 45, § 6(2) 
(requiring notice of impending mergers of amalgamations). 
 132 See RAMAPPA, supra note 63, at 258 (explaining the procedure the CCI implements in 
assessing a combination).  
 133 The Competition Act, supra note 45, § 31(3). 
 134 See Kaur, supra note 2, at 35–36 (identifying some concerns with the AML and the 
Competition Act). 
 135 KY P. EWING JR., COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES FROM 
AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE 45 (2d ed. 2006) (quoting Eleanor Fox, Can We Control Merger 
Control?: An Experiment, POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER REVIEW 79–90 (1999)). 
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“[t]his Law is applicable to monopolistic practices as part of economic 
activities occurring within the People’s Republic of China.”136  This law also 
applies to monopolistic practices outside of China that have the effect or 
eliminating of restricting Chinese market competition.”137  Section 32 of the 
Competition Act explicitly expands the CCI’s mandate to transactions 
outside of India’s borders if the transaction at issue “has, or is likely to have, 
an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market in 
India.”138   
One problem the international community has with the extraterritorial 
effects of these laws is their potential to be wielded as a type of unilateral 
bludgeon, meaning that MOFCOM or the CCI could potentially block 
transnational mergers that have little to do with their respective nations.139  
This type of nationalistic behavior is not uncommon among developed 
countries, and it follows that developing nations seeking to promote their 
own domestic agendas through antitrust law would not balk at similar 
behavior if doing so would promote their economic policy.140  However, 
extraterritorial abuse of their respective antitrust laws would likely be a self-
defeating move for China or India.  Each country created a competition law 
as a means to encourage and control the growth of its domestic economy.141  
Abuse of the extraterritorial reach of the AML or Competition Act would 
stymie these attempts, because such behavior could decrease foreign 
investment in Chinese or Indian industry due to the likely perception that the 
Chinese and Indian antitrust authorities are overly protectionist.142   
                                                                                                                   
 136 AML, supra note 45, art. 2.  
 137 Id. 
 138 The Competition Act, supra note 45, § 32. 
 139 See MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 3, 5 (2003) 
(explaining how a country’s apparent willingness to apply its’ antitrust laws extraterritorially 
creates friction between foreign governments and can be damaging to firms engaged in 
international business).   
 140 See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and 
Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781, 1803–05 (2000) (cataloging incidences where developed 
countries, like the United States, Japan, and the European Union, have antagonistically 
employed their antitrust laws in the past). 
 141 See discussion supra Part II.C (explaining how the respective texts of the AML and the 
Competition Act each support the idea that they were adopted to promote economic growth). 
 142 See Li Yanping, China Dismisses Retaliation Fears Over Coke Decision (Update 1), 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2009, 4:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchiv 
e&sid=aMFZ5ZcMXYM0 (addressing protectionist concerns in China regarding the blocked 
Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Juice Company deal). 
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B.  International Concerns Regarding the AML 
While the AML is generally quite similar to the U.S. and EU antitrust 
laws, there are some specific differences in the AML that create pointed 
apprehension among members of the international community with a 
business interest in the Chinese market.143  One notable difference is the 
AML’s purpose of promoting the socialist market economy.144  This goal 
allows for a broad interpretation of the potential breadth of the law and its 
application, because the AML does not define the method used to achieve 
this goal.145   
Other prevalent concerns with the application of the AML’s merger 
provisions are that its provisions incorporate “additional, non-competition 
related factors into the analysis . . .” of whether a merger will be allowed.146  
The most troubling of these is the term “national security,” the exact 
definition of which is not provided in the text of the AML.147  It has been 
posited that the best way to understand the application of such undefined 
terms is to investigate the case law, which might be true in a country like the 
U.S. that has provided detailed judicial review of mergers, but has proven 
mostly unhelpful in shedding light on MOFCOM’s assessment process in 
China.148  
C.  International Concerns Regarding the Competition Act  
While concerns over the AML revolve around the fact that it continues to 
leave many variables unknown, the international consensus on the 
Competition Act is that its implementation has taken many international 
concerns regarding its drafting into account.149  The issues lie less with what 
the Competition Act leaves unsaid and more with what it lays out explicitly. 
One example of this is concern over the potential 210 day statutory time 
frame allowed for review and approval of any combination.150  This potential 
lag in time is especially irksome due to the potential extraterritorial effects of 
                                                                                                                   
 143 Susan Beth Farmer, The Impact of China’s Antitrust Law and Other Competition Policies 
on U.S. Companies, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 34, 35 (2010). 
 144 AML, supra note 45, art. 1. 
 145 Farmer, supra note 143, at 42–46. 
 146 Id. at 36. 
 147 Id. at 46. 
 148 Id. at 46–48. 
 149 Carpenter et al., supra note 115, at 1. 
 150 See id. at 2–3 (explaining that the 210 day statutory time frame allowed for the CCI to 
pass final orders remains unchanged, and that this timeframe could negatively impact foreign 
mergers that have little practical effect in India). 
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a CCI review.  Concerns also exist regarding potential sectoral overlap 
between the CCI and other regulators and how this will affect companies’ 
ability to comply with the requirements of multiple regulators.151  The most 
troublesome perceived shortcoming of the Competition Act has little to do 
with the law itself, but instead deals with the perceived inability of the CCI 
to maintain the necessary confidentiality to avoid harming companies’ stock 
price and to avoid what has been, in India, a historically cut-throat 
environment for corporate rivalry.152 
These international concerns beg the question, how far should either 
China or India go in attempting to placate the nations expressing these 
concerns?  To what degree should China or India subordinate its own stated 
goals regarding merger regulation and antitrust law?  If it is in fact worth the 
trouble each country would go through to assuage these concerns, what 
models exist that China and India can follow?  The next section focuses on 
these issues and attempts to answer whether, regardless of international 
pressure, the international community should expect China and India to at 
some point “look out for number one,” and that such self-service should be 
expected from developing economies. 
V.  HARMONIZATION: WORTH THE TROUBLE OR JUST TOO MUCH 
DISSONANCE? 
Arguably, neither China nor India should make a meaningful change to 
their laws.  China’s economy, as well as India’s, continues to grow at an 
exceptionally high rate even amidst the current global economic recession.153  
Both the AML and the Competition Act were implemented for similar 
reasons, namely to regulate foreign entities in their domestic operations 
within China and India and to entice foreign business investment, and it can 
                                                                                                                   
 151 See Zerick Dastur, India: Sectoral Interplay and the Antitrust Regime, MONDAQ (July 6, 
2011), http://mondaq.com/x/136230/Antitrust+Competition/Sectoral+Interplay+And+The+Anti 
+Trust+Regime (detailing how merger regulation under the CCI could potentially butt heads 
with other specialized sectoral regulators, specifically in the banking industry). 
 152 Kiran S. Desai et al., India: India Competition Report, MONDAQ, section 3 (Aug. 19, 
2011), http://mondaq.com/x/143274/Price+Fixing/India+Competition+Report; Zerick Dastur, 
India: Competition Law Only After It Sinks In, MONDAQ (June 24, 2011), http://mondaq.com/ 
x/136224/Antitrust+Competition/Competiti on+Law+Only+After+It+Sinks+In. 
 153 See China Overview, WORLD BANK (2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/ 
overview (outlining how China’s economy has grown throughout the last decade); India 
Overview, WORLD BANK (2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/india/overview 
(discussing India’s rapid growth over the last decade). 
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be claimed that both systems are currently mechanisms to achieve these 
goals.154   
However, this assertion fails to account for a couple important factors.  
First, both the AML and the Competition Act’s merger regulation provisions 
are new laws representative of each country’s first attempt at comprehensive 
regulation of a market economy.155  India’s merger guidelines are still being 
tweaked to fit into the international merger control puzzle more comfortably.  
The AML’s opacity and lack of predictable enforcement thus far has shed 
very little light on how its requirements are analyzed by MOFCOM, which 
might be negatively impacting China’s attempts at inducing foreign 
investment through mergers.  As shown by its opinion explaining why Coca-
Cola’s proposed merger with Huiyuan Fruit Juice was denied, MOFCOM 
has not been overly forthcoming in its explanations other than its vague 
references to undefined notions of a merger’s “adverse effects on 
competition,” and that merger review goals are to “protect fair market 
competition[ ] and to safeguard the interests of consumers as well as the 
public interest.”156  India has shown itself to be open to input from foreign 
countries in its efforts to refine the Competition Act, as evidenced by the 
willingness of the CCI to incorporate suggestions from the international 
community into the new Combination Regulations.157  This demonstrates 
that, at least in the early stage of adoption, the CCI will likely be amenable to 
changing parts of the law to better accommodate international concerns.   
Of course, that China and India’s merger provisions have yet to cause 
harmful friction among the international community or the business investors 
the two countries wish to regulate and attract does not mean the laws should 
remain static.  There are other questions to be answered regarding whether 
China and India should harmonize their laws to further fit international laws, 
and if such an attempt is worth either country’s efforts.158 
A.  Harmonization: Who Will Benefit? 
As the number of countries adopting national competition laws continues 
to increase, two prominent ideas regarding the process of harmonizing these 
laws have emerged.  The first is that harmonization between different 
                                                                                                                   
 154 See discussion supra Part II.C (explaining the reasons behind the adoption of the AML 
and The Competition Act). 
 155 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 7, India 6–7. 
 156 Batson, supra note 101. 
 157 See generally Desai et al., supra note 152 (explaining the suggested changes from the 
international community that were implemented in the CCI Regulations). 
 158 Diane P. Wood, International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or the 
Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 398 (2002). 
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jurisdictions’ laws would benefit many of the “relevant stakeholders” 
concerned with international competition law.159  The second is that, 
regardless of the net positive effects such harmonization would create, it is 
an unlikely achievement at any point in the near future.160  While it is settled 
that some countries would gain were global competition laws to be 
harmonized, it is unclear which countries would make up that group.  As 
developing economies, China and India might be better served, at least for 
the present, by tending their own burgeoning expertise in the application of 
their respective competition laws at the expense of the international antitrust 
community.  However, this assertion carries little weight in a vacuum, and 
therefore additional questions must be answered. 
The first question in assessing international competition law 
harmonization is, who needs harmonization?161  In the merger context, the 
business community has made it known that they would endorse further 
harmonization.162  They believe that harmonization, will cut down on 
transaction costs and will prevent the much-feared “hold-up” situation, 
wherein the country with the most stringent merger review policy will be in a 
position to block a merger that may have only a passing relationship with its 
national interests.163  Also, further harmonization is thought to reduce 
transaction costs by cutting down on the number of competition authorities 
that a company must notify before proceeding with a planned merger.164  
This concern speaks to many nations’ concerns regarding the extraterritorial 
effects of China and India’s competition laws.  China’s history of seeking 
council from countries with more experience regulating competition laws 
prior to adopting the AML, as well as India’s willingness to implement 
suggestions from the international community in its enactment of the 
Competition Act’s merger provisions, make a plausible case that the two 
countries would be amenable to addressing this concern through further 
harmonization.165   
Another question that needs to be addressed is, “would there be other 
unintended consequences from a push to harmonize competition laws, 
resulting from the fact that each country and region presently has a 
                                                                                                                   
 159 Crane, supra note 3, at 143.  
 160 Id.  
 161 Wood, supra note 158, at 398. 
 162 Id. at 399. 
 163 Id. at 399–400. 
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competition law that fits within its own legal system and reflects its own 
history and enforcement priorities?”166  One anticipated consequence is that a 
true international framework would undermine country-specific goals in 
adopting an antitrust law as a necessary consequence of international 
harmonization.167  If a true international antitrust model is put in place under 
the authority of an international body, nations like India and China that have 
already adopted a competition law would be short-changed, as it is likely that 
the U.S. and EU antitrust laws would act as the model for any such 
international framework.168   Consequences such as these would likely 
engender a great deal of resistance from China and India, who, as detailed 
above, enacted competition laws as a means to protect their own domestic 
markets from more established American and European corporations, as well 
as to encourage international investment in their economies.  These 
nationalistic concerns, along with the fact that many countries still lack a 
competition law, make it appear that harmonization under a large 
international framework is unlikely to happen in the near future.169  While 
full-scale international harmonization may not be a viable option presently, 
there are still methods of harmonization that could benefit China and India 
and the respective applications of their competition laws. 
B.  International Harmonization Mechanisms   
Many models have been advanced as possible mechanisms for the 
international harmonization of antitrust law, which can be filed under three 
general classifications: hard harmonization, intermediate harmonization, and 
soft harmonization.170  Essentially, hard harmonization is legally binding 
international policy.171  As discussed above, this type of harmonization is 
unlikely given the current pride of place given to the advancement of 
domestic goals over assuaging international concerns among developing 
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countries, China and India included.  Some experts hold that hard 
harmonization can be achieved through the WTO, but the general consensus 
is that “[f]or many reasons . . . it seems clear that the world is not ready yet 
for hard harmonization of competition laws.”172 
Intermediate harmonization, which may also be referred to as the choice 
of law option, is comprised of agreements among nations, like the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to abide by specific bilateral or 
multilateral resolutions between nations and to commit to some idea of “best 
practices.”173  One of the main concerns with implementing this sort of 
harmonization practice in the global context is that such agreements will be 
either overbroad or so hyper specific that they are rendered meaningless and 
ineffective.174  However, leading antitrust experts believe that a major step 
towards the benefits of international antitrust harmonization is represented by 
the guidelines propagated by the International Competition Network 
(ICN).175  India is currently a member of the ICN, and many commentators 
have urged China to subscribe to the organization’s “Recommended 
Practices” guidelines.176  These pleas have thus far fallen on deaf ears, as 
China remains unaffiliated with the ICN.177 
Finally, soft harmonization, or “information sharing,” is comprised of 
nonbinding, collaborative learning between countries that have adopted, or 
are looking to adopt, an antitrust law.178 This method has been utilized by the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), which 
propagates goal-oriented texts on international competition law, none of 
which are binding.179  This type of harmonization is already occurring in 
China and India, as evidenced by the AML’s fourteen year gestation period 
and India’s continued willingness to listen and implement suggestions from 
the international community.180  In the long term, continuing openness to 
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similar learning experiences could create a platform for more formal 
harmonization between China, India, and the rest of the world.  But for the 
present, this soft harmonization approach is likely the best option for all 
parties involved in the evolution of the AML and the Competition Act.181  
Any attempt at a more extreme, binding type of international law will likely 
be met with resistance from not only China and India, but other developing 
economies as well.  This would harm not only China and India’s interest in 
continued international investment in their domestic industries, but also harm 
more developed nations, like the U.S., in their attempts to expand domestic 
business into emerging foreign markets.  Because hard harmonization by its 
nature is binding international law, it is unlikely that there will be any real 
international push for the codification of such agreements.  As a result, “soft 
harmonization” will likely continue as the primary catalyst for global 
harmonization in antitrust law.182  
The consensus among the international community and international 
business leaders is that some level of global harmonization in antitrust laws 
is desirable.183  Therefore, the question for China and India is which of the 
disparate harmonization approaches makes the most sense within the context 
of their domestic goals and the application of their respective competition 
laws.  The three methods of harmonization discussed above each have their 
defenders and detractors.  The next section applies these perceived positives 
and negatives and offers suggestions for how India and China can further 
adapt their laws to fit into the global antitrust puzzle, while maintaining the 
integrity of their domestic purposes and furthering their state-specific goals. 
VI.  ENDORSEMENT 
Like many developing countries that have adopted competition laws, 
China and India have done so to regulate their recently implemented market 
economies, as well as to promote their own domestic goals.184  China aims to 
maintain domestic tranquility and to promote the development and growth of 
the “socialist market economy.”185  India wishes to regulate the continued 
growth of its economy while maintaining a “level playing field” for their 
domestic firms with regards to the recent influx of foreign corporations 
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seeking to establish a presence on India’s economic landscape.186  These 
goals will likely be undermined should China and India attempt to engage in 
any sort of global, hard harmonization.  Instead, it would be more beneficial 
if the Chinese and Indian competition authorities remained open to 
international input, via channels of soft harmonization, while further 
attempting to follow some intermediate harmonization models. 
It should be encouraging to the international community that the Chinese 
and Indian competition authorities have thus far been open to feedback from 
the international community and have proven willing, to an extent, to adapt 
their laws to meet some of the more pointed criticisms leveled at the AML 
and the Competition Act.  If this level of receptiveness continues, many of 
the concerns regarding the AML and the Competition Act may be remedied 
organically as MOFCOM and the CCI become more adept at administering 
their respective laws.  To further promote foreign investment in their 
countries and to assuage some of the fears engendered by their laws’ 
potential for extraterritorial application, China and India should both attempt 
to be more transparent in applying their competition laws.  “Transparency is 
an important antidote to many pathologies . . . . It promotes clarity in policy 
formation, increases the understanding of legal commands by affected 
parties, and disciplines the exercise of discretion by public officials by 
subjecting their actions to external review and criticism.”187  China and India 
both benefit from further transparency in the application of their merger 
regulation provisions.  Thus far, as shown in the reasons offered by 
MOFCOM for the block of the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan merger, China’s 
competition authority has not been vague and uninstructive with their 
interpretations of the AML’s merger provisions.   
More concrete explanations of how the AML’s merger provisions are 
applied would alleviate concerns over the potential for abuse by the Chinese 
competition authorities.  Due to the centralized nature of the Chinese 
government, some observers might take further explanation of the merger 
provisions with a grain of salt because the application of the AML will likely 
shift as China’s domestic goals change.  This, however, is true of 
competition law in general.188  Therefore, greater transparency should still be 
a goal for China’s competition authorities, as the increased insights into the 
decision-making process would, as Kovacic states, make MOFCOM and its 
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regulatory brethren accountable for their decisions.189  This accountability 
should help China increase foreign investment in their industries via mergers, 
as the increased accountability would relieve international tensions brought 
on by a perceived foreign bias in China’s application of the AML.190   
India would similarly benefit from greater transparency with regards to 
how they utilize the information required by the Competition Act’s 
notification procedures.  More in depth explanation as to the interplay 
between the CCI and the different sectoral regulators would allay 
international business concerns over the confidentiality of potentially 
sensitive information tendered during merger review, which would further 
incentivize foreign investment in the Indian economy. 
Increased transparency, in addition to maintaining policies in favor of 
accepting international input and advice, would likely promote both 
countries’ stated primary and secondary goals for their competition laws.  
But these soft harmonization techniques are not the only harmonization 
mechanisms of which China and India should avail themselves. 
As noted in Part V.B, India is currently a member of the ICN while China 
remains unaffiliated.191  Membership in the ICN is voluntary and, as of 2009, 
ninety-two jurisdictions were contributing members in ICN’s mission “to 
improve and advocate for sound competition policy and its enforcement 
across the global antitrust community.”192  The ICN seeks input from its 
member nations to cut down on inefficient application of competition law, 
and China’s membership would likely enrich both MOFCOM’s expertise in 
administering merger review as well as other ICN member-nations’ 
understanding of the AML.  Because China invested so much research and 
acquired so much feedback during the fourteen year gestation period of the 
AML, its involvement in the ICN would both further global convergence of 
competition law as well as provide additional reassurance to the international 
community.  Because involvement with the ICN is voluntary, China’s ability 
to promote its “socialist market economy” would not face the same danger of 
being swept away as it would if hard harmonization were implemented.193  
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China’s involvement with ICN would be especially timely considering its 
recent bilateral trade agreement with India.194 
China and India have both made great strides in implementing successful 
market economies in the last twenty years.195  Their implementation of 
competition laws as a means to ensure continued growth, although causing 
trepidation among the international business community, has thus far been a 
reasonably smooth operation.  Both countries would benefit from continued 
input from more experienced antitrust authorities as their fledgling 
enforcement authorities gain expertise.  Membership in non-binding 
international groups like the ICN would benefit both countries by allowing 
them access to greater levels of expertise from the international community, 
while still imparting the added benefit of maintaining the freedom to promote 
their respective domestic goals.  These goals, the “socialist market economy” 
in China and the “level playing field” in India, should be regarded by the 
international community not as a millstone weighing down the economic 
possibilities inherent in investment in China or India, but as another starting 
point for debate and change in the field of international competition law.196 
VII.  CONCLUSION  
China and India are two of the world’s largest and fastest growing 
international markets.  These countries recognize that to continue this 
growth, effective regulation of their domestic industries must contend with 
an increasing international presence as foreign firms seek to carve out a piece 
of the Chinese and Indian markets.  There are many other broad similarities 
between the two nations’ respective economic situations: each have, in the 
last twenty years, decided that a domestic movement toward a market 
economy is necessary to ensure their continued economic evolution; both 
view their implementation of more modern, internationally friendly 
competition laws as crucial to this evolution’s success; and both, while 
inviting foreign investment in their economies, are utilizing their competition 
laws to ensure that the international presence in their markets does not 
overwhelm their domestic industry.  
However, the two Asian powers also have their own specific, domestic 
goals they hope to promote through the implementation of their competition 
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laws.  For China, this goal is to promote a “Harmonious Society” and to 
allow for the continuing growth of their “socialist market economy.”  India, 
meanwhile, seeks simply to maintain a “level playing field” for the growth of 
their domestic industries.  Due to the relative newness of these two countries’ 
competition laws generally, and the merger provisions specifically, the 
international antitrust community has concerns about how the laws will be 
applied in the future.  The AML and the Competition Act each contain 
provisions that make clear the laws apply extraterritorially, which causes 
further trepidation among the international community.  However, China and 
India have, throughout the gestation periods for their competition laws, 
shown themselves to be open and accepting of international input regarding 
how their competition laws can function most effectively in the international 
context.  
There is general agreement that further convergence among the world’s 
antitrust laws is a positive goal, and is one that the international community 
should attempt to facilitate.  The debate begins once the conversation turns to 
how such harmonization should occur.  There are many disparate ideas as to 
the most effective way to encourage global harmonization, and they can be 
broadly grouped under the headings of soft, intermediate, and hard antitrust 
harmonization.  Soft harmonization is the most widespread method currently 
in practice, as it is the least binding of the three, and is essentially just the 
voluntary exchange of information between countries.  Intermediate 
harmonization, as well as hard harmonization, have both been found to be 
appropriate in some specific contexts, but are not as widely adopted as the 
less binding soft harmonization model.   
To further their specific domestic goals, China and India should continue 
their practice of accepting and listening to the ideas posited by international 
experts to encourage further investment in their respective economies.  Also, 
both countries should strive to promote greater transparency in the 
application of their competition laws in order to mollify foreign concerns 
over the potential for arbitrary enforcement and to encourage beneficial 
mergers to be pursued in their countries.   
While hard harmonization is unlikely to be viewed favorably by China or 
India, an intermediate resolution such as China’s membership in the ICN, 
would prove beneficial for both competition regimes.  Each country has 
received enormous amounts of international expertise throughout the drafting 
and implementation of their competition laws, and their competition 
authorities’ unique perspectives should prove valuable to other ICN 
members.  If both countries take active roles in the global antitrust and 
merger review conversation, it might sharpen the Chinese and Indian 
competition authorities’ skills in the application of their laws and in their 
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merger review process, thus assuaging international fears of extraterritorial 
abuse and potentially hastening the slow current of global antitrust law 
harmonization. 
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